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Abstract 
The paper investigates sharp reductions seen in current account deficits in selected transition countries in the 1992-
2003 period. The analysis focuses on three important aspects of these current account reversals: a) to examine those 
factors that might have triggered the reversals and to provide some insights into the current account adjustment 
process; b) to reveal some characteristics of persistent current account deficits; and c) to investigate the direct impact 
of these reversals on economic growth in the region. Results suggest that restrictively defined reversals seem to be 
closely related to factors such as domestic savings, real export growth, international reserves and external 
indebtedness as well as with the budget and trade balances. While the role of exchange rate depreciation seems 
ambiguous, we found that the sharp current account reversals are systematically associated with a gradual GDP 
growth slowdown in the pre-reversal period and with robust GDP growth impetus afterwards. Indeed, less 
restrictively defined reversals show that reversals are associated with an increase of output by around 1.20 
percentage points in the second year of recovery. Finally, the results suggest the significant possibility that persistent 
current account deficits, which on average last more than five years, are consumption-driven in the transition 
countries. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
After the centrally planned economy ceased to exist, the process of post-socialist transformations has 
advanced significantly. 27 countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), Southern and Eastern Europe 
(SEE) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) have since been involved in vast systematic 
changes. Undoubtedly, these changes have been leading to full-fledged market economies, although the 
precise outcome of transformation is not going to be the same for all countries involved. In fact, some 
leaders, i.e. the CEE region, joined the EU in 2004 while others, especially countries of the CIS region, 
are lagging behind in systematic changes and maintaining a hybrid system with remnants of central 
planning existing alongside elements of market regulation and a growing private sector. However, these 
changes have influenced their external balances significantly raising doubts about their sustainability and 
concerns over the potential impact that a rapid and disorderly correction of these imbalances might have. 
Roubini and Wachtel (1999) argued that the current account deficits seen in transition economies reflect 
two important aspects. On one hand, these deficits reflect the success of structural changes that have 
enabled capital and investment inflows and have opened up prospects of fast economic growth. On the 
other hand, from another perspective current account deficits frequently reflect mismanaged transition 
processes featuring unsustainable imbalances that are potentially a source of a value or a currency and/or 
balance of payments crisis (e.g. Czech Rep. (1997), Russia (1998)). In fact, the general view is that 
postponing current account adjustments increases the costs of adjustment in the economy. However, 
given that financial markets in transition countries are gradually operating efficiently, the deterioration of 
current account balances might offer investment opportunities in the region compared to the rest of the 
world. Indeed, a growing deficit might be a sign of the gradual growth of the economic strength of the 
transition economies and is thus not necessarily a bad thing. In line with this, strong demands have 
emerged for assessing the sustainability of the current account positions as well as those factors 
determining the current account deficit reversals of the so far mainly (empirically) neglected transition 
countries.  
The current account position’s significance stems from the fact that the current account balance, reflecting 
the saving-investment ratio, is closely related to the status of the budget balance and private savings 
which are key factors of economic growth. Practically all transition countries have been involved in their 
own catching-up processes which includes financing a huge amount of productive investment without 
endangering their external sustainability as far as their current account positions and external debt are 
concerned.
1 In fact, these countries suffer from relatively low and even stagnant saving rates. Hence, to 
close the gap they need to turn to foreign saving which has generally induced the high and even growing 
current account deficits of the last decade. In this respect, the problem of external imbalances is 
particularly important for CEE countries which have already expressed their desire to adopt the euro as 
                                                 
1 For instance from an intertemporal perspective, Bussière et al. (2004) found that current accounts in most CEE countries (i.e. 
new EU member countries) are broadly in line with their structural current account positions. Nevertheless, one needs to 
underline that this does not necessarily rule out the possibility of a sharp current account adjustment due to other reasons not 
included in the model (e.g. liquidity and solvency issues).    2
soon as possible. Consequently, for the new (and other prospective) members of the EU a trade-off has 
emerged between the catching up process and meeting the qualitative current account Maastricht criteria.
2         
While there are well-known characteristics of current account reversals in developed countries where, in 
particular, currency depreciation and a decrease in GDP growth are involved (see e.g. Freund (2000), 
Debelle and Galati (2005), Clarida et al. (2005), Adalet and Eichengreen (2005) and Croke et al. (2005)) 
there are few surveys for current account adjustments in transition countries (Roubini and Wachtel 
(1999), Zanghieri, P. (2004), Melecky (2005)), mainly due to the short time span as well as data 
unreliability and deficiencies. Therefore, the present paper seeks to fill this gap in at least three analytical 
directions. First, we examine those factors that might have triggered the reversals and provide some 
insights into the current account adjustment process. We investigate the role of domestic internal factors 
such as output growth and domestic savings and external sector factors such as the real effective exchange 
rate and external indebtedness. We focus on two different reversal episodes, i.e. Reversal I (68 episodes) 
and Reversal II (10 episodes), whereas the first one is significantly less restrictive. Second, we also try to 
reveal some characteristics of persistent current account deficits in the region. We identify and examine 
10 episodes of current account deficit persistency in twelve transition countries. Moreover, we undertake 
a study of the indicators and consequences of current account deficit reversals and persistency in 
transition countries over the 1992-2003 period using an analysis similar to Milesi-Ferretti (2000, hereafter 
‘MFR’), Freund (2000), Debelle and Galati (2005). At the end, we also examine the direct impact of the 
reversals on economic growth in the region. The experiences of many emerging market countries in 
recent years, such as Mexico (in 1994), the Asian countries (1997), and Argentina (2001), set out an 
association between current account adjustment and GDP growth slowdown. This outcome is also 
empirically tested and confirmed by resent research of current account adjustments in these countries (see 
MFR (2000) and Edwards (2004)). However, in order to examine the external adjustment impact on 
growth in the transition countries, we in a way upgrade the work of Melecky (2005) by extending the time 
span and number of transition countries included in the sample. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section of the paper contains a discussion of some theoretical 
and empirical issues of the current account reversals. Section 3 summarizes trends and developments in 
current account balances in transition countries. This section also defines episodes of reversals and the 
persistency of current account balances in the region in order to examine the current account adjustment 
process in the sample countries. The next section empirically estimates the static effect of a current 
account reversal on economic growth. Thus, the empirical framework and results from the pooled cross-
sectional and time-series data estimations with a variety of robustness tests are presented in Section 4. 
The final section provides concluding remarks.     
 
 
                                                 
2 Article 121 (Treaty of the European Union, 1992) states that among other (qualitative) criteria »the situation and the evolution 
of the balance of current payments« of the applicant countries have to be examined before they enter the Euro Area. Recently, an 
important step towards the Euro Area was taken by Estonia, Lithuania and Slovenia which joined the ERM II with effect from 28 
June 2004 and Latvia from 2 May 2005.   3
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND RECENT EMPIRICAL LITERATURE  
 
In his comprehensive review Edwards (2001) describes the evolving views of economists regarding the 
nature and consequences of current account deficits. The attitude has changed from ‘the current account 
matters’ to ‘the current account deficit does not matter as long as the public sector is in balance’, then to 
‘the current account deficit may matter’. In fact, in the 1970s this elastic approach to the current account 
was placed on the backburner and attention was switched to the intertemporal properties of current 
account deficits. In terms of national accounting, the current account is simply the difference between 
national saving and investment. Since both saving and investment are inherently intertemporal 
phenomena, e.g. saving with respect to the lifetime of individuals and investment with respect to the 
expected future return on investment, the same must also hold for the current account.  
In this respect, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) provided an extensive review of modern models of the current 
account that assume intertemporal optimisation on behalf of consumers and firms. In this type of model 
(assuming a constant interest rate), consumption smoothing across periods is one of the fundamental 
drivers of the current account. According to the intertemporal approach, if output falls below its 
permanent value there will be a higher current account deficit. Similarly, if investment increases above its 
permanent value the current account deficit will grow. The reason for this is that new investment projects 
will be partially financed by an increase in foreign borrowing, thus generating a bigger current account 
deficit. Likewise, increased government consumption will result in a higher current account deficit. If the 
constant world interest rate assumption is relaxed, a country’s net foreign asset position and the level of 
the world interest rate would fundamentally affect the current account deficit. Accordingly, if a country is 
a net foreign debtor, and the world interest rate exceeds its permanent level, the current account deficit 
would be higher (Miller, 2002).  
During the last three decades most financial crises have highlighted the part played by large current 
account deficits in the run-up to crisis episodes. Consequently, the concept of a sustainable current 
account deficit has become an important theoretical, political and economic issue. In this respect, Corsetti 
et al. (1998) concluded that, on the whole, those countries hit hardest by currency crises were those which 
had persistent current account deficits throughout the 1990s.
3 This result is confirmed by Radelet and 
Sachs (2000), Kamin et al. (2001), Fischer (2003) and Edwards (2004), whereby Edwards shows that the 
probability of experiencing abrupt current account reversals is closely linked to the size of current account 
deficits. Accordingly, although this is not a universal truth, the conventional wisdom is that current 
account deficits above 5 percent of GDP generally represent a problem, especially if funded through 
short-term borrowing. However, because of the lasting improvement in capital market access and as 
predicted by the intertemporal models, the persistent enhancement of the terms of trade and productivity 
growth seen in transition countries can finance moderate current account deficits on an ongoing basis. 
Nevertheless, Edwards (2001) supported the relevance of current account imbalances as there is strong 
evidence that large current account deficits should be a cause for concern of economic policy.  
                                                 
3 Nevertheless, this does not imply that a large deficit always leads to a crisis, nor that a crisis can only occur if a large current 
account deficit is present (Summers, 2000).     4
Generally, there is a common view that current account adjustment tends to proceed more smoothly in 
developed countries as it emerges through marked changes in quantities. The main reasons for the 
smoother adjustment process in developed countries involve the developed and functioning institutional 
framework, deep and liquid capital markets, more diversified real economy and the ability to issue 
liabilities in domestic currency. A wide range of literature is devoted to adjustment processes in 
developed countries. For example, Freund (2000) analyses the adjustment process in 25 developed 
(industrial) countries. By examining the episodes of current account reversals (between 1980 and 1997), 
she noted that typical reversals occurred when the current account to GDP ratio reached 5 percent. 
Further, the reversals were typically characterized by a substantial output growth decline and a 10-20 
percent real depreciation of the currency, as well as by an increase in real export growth, a decline in 
domestic investment, and some levels off in the budget deficit and the net international investment 
position. As she concluded, current account adjustment processes tend to be driven by cyclical factors. 
Latter researches, mostly building on Freund’s (2000) work, yield similar results (sizable economic 
growth slowdown and large exchange rate depreciations) which have been additionally set out by 
Edwards (2004), Freund and Warnock (2005), and Debelle and Galati (2005). On the other hand, Croke et 
al. (2005) could not find that the adjustment process was associated with a significant and sustained 
depreciation of the real exchange rate in developed countries. Even more, the most substantial 
depreciation occurred among those episodes where GDP growth picked up during the adjustment. 
Accordingly, they conclude that these findings weaken the historical basis for predicting disruptive 
current account adjustments.   
On the other hand, significant attention has also focused on examinations of large current account 
adjustments in low and middle income countries (see e.g. Calvo and Reinhart (1999), MFR (1998, 2000), 
Edwards (2001, 2004), Calvo (2003)). Generally, they show that variables such as current account 
balance, openness, the level of reserves, terms of trade shocks, US growth and real interest rate help 
predict current account reversals in these countries. In particularly extensive research, MFR (1998) 
examined empirical regularities during current account reversals and currency crises using data from 105 
low and middle income countries. In addition to the above findings, he concluded that reversals are more 
likely to occur in countries that have run persistent deficits, in countries with high official transfers and 
whose debt is largely on concessional terms. Moreover, reversals are not systematically associated with a 
decline in output growth and are not strongly associated with a currency crisis (less than one-third of 
reversals were preceded by a currency crisis).      
According to up-to-date theoretical and empirical literature we can expect that current account 
adjustments in transition countries are probably less benign than in developed countries.
4 Indeed, external 
adjustments in transition countries have often involved the abandonment of fixed exchange rate regimes 
(e.g. Czech R. (1997), Slovakia (1998) and Poland (2000)) and, in those circumstances, it is likely to 
                                                 
4 Melecky (2005) found that after a current account reversal in Central and Eastern Europe (including Malta, Cyprus and some 
less developed old EU member states) the GDP growth rate had declined by 1.10 percentage points in the current year. In 
addition, the reversals are likely eliminated after 3.3 years when the actual growth rate is restored and the cumulative loss 
associated with a sudden stop in capital flows is about 2.3 percentage points in the region.      5
anticipate the extent of the currency depreciation
5 and GDP growth slowdown.
6 Further, another possible 
reason for expecting a less benign scenario is that in the transition countries great uncertainty exists about 
monetary policy and fiscal solvency, which leads to greater financial volatility during adjustment episodes 
than in developed countries. Moreover, we can assume that current account reversals in transition 
countries might be generally reversed because of their internal macroeconomic imbalances. Indeed, as an 
economy grows domestic demand growth exceeds domestic output which results in a widening trade and 
current account balance. Growing domestic demand induces the rapid growth of credit and an additional 
rise in inflation. Restrictive monetary policy slows GDP growth down and depresses inflation. The 
combination of a slowdown in the economy and the resulting easing in monetary policy usually reduces 
the attractiveness of domestic economy, resulting in a depreciation of the exchange rate. In addition, the 
fiscal position deteriorates as a result of both fiscal stabilizers as well as imprudent government measures. 
However, to test the presented less benign scenario and to provide some further insights into the current 
account adjustment processes in transition countries different approaches will be applied in the rest of this 
paper. 
 
3. CURRENT ACCOUNT IMBALANCES AND REVERSALS IN TRANSITION COUNTRIES 
3.1. Current account imbalances in transition countries 
The overview of the current account balance in transition countries shows that, with the exception of 
Russia – a major commodity exporter, the opening up to external trade has been accompanied by 
significant current account deficits (see Table 1). In CEE current account balances were not problematic 
with even a moderate positive balance as a share of GDP up until 1994 (averaging around 1 percent of 
GDP), reflecting contractions in domestic demand, real exchange rate undervaluations and external 
financing constraints. Afterwards, significant current account deficit deterioration was noticed in the 
region, peaking at almost 7 percent of GDP in 1998 on average (e.g. Lithuania (11.7), Latvia (10.7) and 
Slovakia (9.6)), mostly as a result of growing imports of both consumption and investment goods. 
Moreover, the gradual growth of the current account deficit in the CEE region reflects a combination of 
long-term growth and structural factors, external shocks and domestic policies. More precisely, the 
deterioration of current accounts in the region was the result of the growth of merchandise trade deficits, 
downward trends in the service balance, rising indebtedness and profit repatriation as well as the 
consequence of the continuous real appreciation of domestic currency in most cases examined.  
Similar but even more intensive current account deficit dynamics were seen in the CIS region by 
achieving the top average current account deficit at a significantly higher level (13.7 percent of GDP) 
than the CEE region in 1998. The major contributors to such a huge deterioration in the current account 
balance were some countries in the region with current account deficits above 20 percent of GDP (e.g. 
                                                 
5 Fore example, Edwards (2004) confirms that countries with more flexible exchange rate regimes are better able to 
accommodate than countries with relatively more fixed exchange rate regimes.  
6 Indeed, all three countries (Czech R., Slovakia and Poland) were confronted with a significant GDP slowdown in the following 
years. Eventually, when comparing annual GDP growth in the year before switching the exchange rate regime with the following 
three-year average, Czech R, Slovakia and Poland demonstrated a GDP growth decline of 3.5, 2.0 and 1.8 percentage points, 
respectively.    6
Turkmenistan (37.4), Azerbaijan (30.7) etc.). Several factors contributed to this development. First, many 
countries in the region experienced large losses in their terms of trade as prices for energy imports from 
the former Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) trading partners moved to market-
determined levels. Second, these countries ran high negative fiscal imbalances as authorities tried to 
absorb the revenue and expenditure pressure associated with sharp falls in national income and fiscal 
restructuring (see Table 1). Third, as a result of slow progress in building a competitive and diversified 
export sector trade liberalization mainly stimulated imports of consumer goods and services. As a 
response to the Russian crisis the average current account deficits narrowed in the group. However, in 
many cases the deficits remained high – around or even above 10 percent of GDP (Azerbaijan (15.9), 
Armenia (8.1) etc.) on average in the recent 2001-2003 period. On the other hand, the SEE region 
achieved the highest average current account deficit with around 20 percent of GDP in 1992 due to the 
enormous deficit seen in Albania (68.5 percent). Later these huge external imbalances improved 
significantly. However, at the beginning of the second half of the 1990s and in the first years of the 21st 
century they again deteriorated. Eventually, the average current account deficit was 8.2 percent of GDP in 
the 2001-2003 period in comparison to the previous three years when it averaged out at 5.9 percent of 
GDP (see Figure 1).    
 
 
Figure 1:  Average current account balance (CA), budget balance (GB) and private balance (PB)  
  in transition countries (in percentage of GDP; unweighted averages) 
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Sources: WDI (2004), EIU (2004), EBRD (2004), own calculations.   7
Table 1:   Saving/Investment Imbalances in Transition Countries  
(in percentage of GDP; unweighted averages) 
 
  Private sector balances  Government balances  Current account balance  
  1992-
1997 
average 
1998-
2003 
average 
1992-
2003 
average 
1992-
1997 
average 
1998-
2003 
average 
1992-
2003 
average 
1992-
1997 
average 
1998-
2003 
average 
1992-
2003 
average
Czech  R.  -3.9 -1.4 -2.7  0.5 -3.4 -1.5 -3.4 -4.8 -4.2
Estonia  -4.3 -7.8 -6.1 -0.1 -0.4 -0.2 -4.4 -8.2 -6.3
Hungary  -1.8 -2.3  -2 -3.5 -5.4 -4.5 -5.3 -7.7 -6.5
Latvia  5.5 -6.8 -0.7 -1.0 -2.2 -1.6  4.5 -9.0 -2.3
Lithuania  -2.7 -3.9 -3.4 -4.1 -3.6 -3.8 -6.8 -7.5 -7.2
Poland  0.5 -0.8 -0.2 -2.9 -3.4 -3.1 -2.4 -4.2 -3.3
Slovakia  0.6  -2 -0.8 -4.1 -4.0 -4.0 -3.5 -6.0 -4.8
Slovenia  2.0 0.6 1.3 0.2  -1.4  -0.6 2.2  -0.8 0.7
CEE    0.0 -3.0 -1.5 -1.8 -3.0 -2.4 -1.8 -6.0 -3.9
Albania  -9.2  2.8  -3.2 -14.4  -8.9 -11.6 -23.6  -6.1 -14.8
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  -19  -11  -14  -1.7  -4.1  -3.3 -20.7 -15.1 -17.3
Bulgaria  6.2 -4.9  0.6 -6.9 -0.4 -3.6 -0.7 -5.3 -3.0
Croatia  -2.4 -0.8 -1.7 -1.6 -5.2 -3.4 -4.0 -6.0 -5.1
Macedonia  0.8  -3 -1.1 -4.8 -2.4 -3.6 -4.0 -5.4 -4.7
Romania  -2.0 -1.3 -1.6 -3.4 -3.5 -3.5 -5.4 -4.8 -5.1
Serbia and 
Montenegro  n.  a. -4.4 -4.8 n.  a. -2.6 -2.6 -8.0 -7.0 -7.4
SEE  -3.9 -3.2 -3.6 -5.9 -3.9 -4.9 -9.8 -7.1 -8.5
Armenia  1.4  -8.9  -3.6 -18.1  -4.0 -11.0 -16.7 -12.9 -14.6
Azerbaijan  -13.8 -12.9 -12.9  -6.0  -1.9  -3.9 -19.8 -14.8 -16.8
Belarus  -3.8 -2.1 -2.8 -3.2 -1.4 -2.3 -7.0 -3.5 -5.1
Georgia  -7.4 -3.6 -5.6  -13.1 -3.8 -8.4  -20.5 -7.4  -14.0
Kazakhstan  -4.3 -0.2 -2.2 -4.9 -1.6 -3.3 -9.2 -1.8 -5.5
Kyrgyz  R.  -4.3 -0.2 -1.7 -9.3 -8.0 -8.7  -13.6 -8.2  -10.4
Moldova  1.0 -8.2 -3.7  -10.2 -1.1 -5.6 -9.2 -9.3 -9.3
Russia  10.2 9.1 9.7  -7.4 0.6  -3.4 2.8 9.7 6.3
Tajikistan  -3.5 -4.1 -3.3  -11.8 -1.1 -6.5  -15.3 -5.2 -9.8
Turkmenistan 13.5  -6 3.8  -3.1 -0.9 -2.0 10.4 -6.9  1.8
Ukraine  8.3 4.5  7  -11.2  -0.5  -5.8  -2.9 4.0 1.2
Uzbekistan  4.0  2.3  3.3 -7.6 -1.4 -4.5 -3.6  0.9 -1.2
CIS  1.3 -2.5 -0.6 -8.8 -2.1 -5.5 -7.5 -4.6 -6.1
ALL 
TRANSITION 
COUNTRIES  -0.9 -2.9 -1.9 -5.5 -3.0 -4.3 -6.4 -5.9 -6.2
Sources: WDI (2004), EIU (2004), EBRD (2004), own calculations. 
 
3.1.1. Development of investment and saving rates in transition countries 
At the start of the transition more than a decade ago the investment-to-GDP ratio in all transition 
countries practically bottomed out in line with the drop in output (see Figure 2). Moreover, much of the 
capital stock at that time became obsolete overnight. Afterwards, investment rebounded particularly in the   8
CEE region (an average of some 28 percent of GDP in 1998) when economies intensively struggled to 
transform their economies into market-oriented ones. Nevertheless, the rise in total investment in most 
transition countries during the 1990s was largely concentrated in the business sector. In fact, in most 
transition countries average government capital expenditure was less than 5 percent of GDP in the period. 
However, as part of the process of real convergence the investment ratio, also including public 
investment, may have to rise further to maintain strong economic growth.  
The various structural reforms being undertaken in transition countries should lead to an increase in the 
marginal productivity of domestic investment. Consequently, the further reform of financial markets, 
particularly in the SEE and CIS regions with respective investment rates of only around 13 and 18 percent 
of GDP in the 2001-2003 period, are needed to ensure efficient and productive capital allocation. 
Moreover, in order to spur growth potential and boost the capacity to service future debt repayments in 
transition countries external borrowing for investment purposes is preferred to borrowing for consumption 
purposes. In this respect, capital inflows, in particular FDI, have been crucial in supporting these 
countries’ stronger investment needs. In fact, for transition countries it may be optimal to attract foreign 
savings and direct them to productive investment. Data suggest that CEE has been the most successful 
region with its net FDI averaging out at almost 5 percent of GDP, whereas the CIS region attracted a net 
FDI of just above 4 percent of GDP on average in the 1992-2003 period.
7 These figures are much higher 
than in developed countries, especially in the EU-15, which averaged less than 3 percent of GDP in the 
same period. 
In most transition countries, during the pre-transition era domestic saving rates were exceptionally high. 
At the end of the 1980s the average saving rates of CEE, SEE and CIS were 32.9, 30.7 and 28.8 percent 
of GDP, respectively. These numbers are relatively high, especially given the EU-15 member states’ 
average saving rate of only some 20 percent of GDP in the same period.
8 However, saving rates within 
the transition economies differed widely, with Poland on top (42.7 percent) in 1989 and Tajikistan (12.5) 
and Kyrgyz Republic (13.1) at the bottom. Denizer and Wolf (2000) revealed three main factors which 
effected savings in the pre-transition era: first there were ‘planned’ savings for funding ‘centrally 
planned’ investment. Second, the lack of consumer goods exposed limits on consumption below the 
desired levels and consequently induced so-called ‘involuntary savings’. Third, savings that were 
voluntary but driven by expectations of a systemic change, e.g. reflecting expectations of the greater 
availability of goods.  
With the start of the transition process, the drop in domestic saving rates was enormous. Schrooten and 
Stephan (2003) pointed out at least three important factors which should be taken into account: 
consumption constraint, the savings overhang inherited from the past, and the massive uncertainty at the 
beginning of the transition process (high inflation, high unemployment, GDP decline etc.). However, a 
relatively slow recovery has been noticed despite huge differences both between and within the group of 
transition countries. For example, saving rates in CEE have stabilized at around 20 percent of GDP (the 
                                                 
7 In the 2000-2003 period the economies most attractive to FDI in the CEE region were Slovakia and Czech Republic with an 
average net FDI of 8.8 and 8.5 percent of GDP, respectively. In the CIS region, the biggest attractions are Azerbaijan and 
Kazakhstan with an average of 13.6 and 9.1 percent of GDP, respectively, in the same period.       
8 The EU-15 average savings rate has remained stable at around 20 percent of GDP since then.     9
highest in Czech Republic with around 26 percent, the lowest in Poland with around 15 percent) on 
average in recent years. On the other hand, in spite of significant saving rates improvements in CIS since 
1998 they have recently remained quite low, at around 17 percent of GDP (the highest in Russia with 
around 32 percent, the lowest in Moldova with even a negative savings rate of around 12 percent).
9  
A decomposition of the external imbalance between savings and investment shows that the main 
determinant of growing current account deficits has been, in general, a remarkable increase in the average 
investment rate in CEE and a significant decline in the average saving rate in SEE and CIS in the 1992-
2003 period.
10 Indeed, the trends presented above mainly suggest an intertemporal approach to the current 
account, where transition countries (in particular CEE) use foreign savings to cushion their consumption 
in the face of unusually high investment needs. Moreover, consumption smoothing in the intertemporal 
approach to the current account predicts a lower saving rate as private agents increase their consumption 
today based on expectations of a higher income in the future. In the case of transition countries, in 
particular in the latter stages of the transition process, the recent liberalization of financial markets and 
steadily improving access to credit by the domestic private sector might be confronted with a declining 
saving rate as uncertainty becomes reduced and liquidity constraints are eased.
11  
 
 
Figure 2:  Average domestic savings and investment in transition countries,  
1992-2003 (in percentage of GDP; unweighted averages) 
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9 Due to data deficiencies it is hard to estimate a reliable level of the saving rate for the SEE region. Nevertheless, according to 
the available data almost all economies in the region have relatively low or even negative saving rates.    
10 In fact, international comparisons (see MFR, 1996) suggest that low and falling saving rates make current account deficits less 
sustainable and potentially make the economy fragile. 
11 Rodrik (2000) estimated that a 1-percentage point increase in the private-credit-to-income ratio would lower the long-term 
private saving rate by 0.74 of a percentage point in five CEE economies.   10
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Sources: WDI (2004), EIU (2004), EBRD (2004), own calculations. 
 
3.2. Current account reversals in transition countries 
We defined current account reversals in two alternative ways. First, Reversal I is a less restrictive one and 
defined (similarly to Edwards (2001) and Melecky (2005)) as a reduction of the deficit of at least 3 
percentage points in one year. Using these criteria on data from 27 transition countries from 1992-2003 
we identify 68 events, presented in Table 1 and Figure 1 (both in Appendix B), by frequency and average 
of the event in each period for the whole region. Second, in order to capture large and persistent current 
account improvements that go beyond short-run current account fluctuations as a result of consumption 
smoothing Reversal II is defined (similarly to MFR (1998) and Freund (2000, 2005), and Debelle and 
Galati (2005)) as: 
a) the current account deficit exceeds two percent of GDP before the reversal; 
b) the deficit was reduced by at least two percentage points of GDP (from the minimum to the three-year 
average); 
c) the maximum deficit in the three (or more available) years after the reversal was not larger than the 
minimum deficit in the three years before the reversal; and 
d) the current account was reduced by at least one-third. 
While first restriction ensures that we examine only episodes of adjustment from a current account deficit, 
the second and third ones ensure that there was a sustained improvement in the current account balances 
rather than sharp but temporary reversals. The last restriction ensures that small improvements in very 
large current account deficits will not be considered as an adjustment (e.g. from 15 to 12 percent). As 
presented in Table 1 and Figure 1 (Appendix B) we identify ten episodes of an (Reversal II) adjustment 
with CA/GDP ratio minimums concentrated between the 1997-2000 period. Moreover, for the complete 
transition region the incidence of Reversal I was 22.2 percent of all country-year observations, while it 
was just 3.3 percent for the Reversal II definition. The lowest incidence of reversals occurred in the 
advanced transition economies (the CEE) with only around 13 percent and in the SEE with 2.5 percent for 
Reversals I and II, respectively. The region with the highest number of incidences is the CIS region with 
27.6 percent and 3.7 percent, respectively.   
   11
3.2.1. Dynamics of the current account adjustment process 
First, to study the adjustment process we focused on ten episodes of Reversals II among transition 
countries. In order to examine external adjustment process in transition countries, we use different 
domestic internal and external macroeconomic aggregates such as real GDP growth, budget balance, 
savings, investments, the exchange rate, trade balance, external debt, international reserves and net 
international investment position. The tabular (Table 4 and 5, Appendix B) and graphical evidence 
(Figure 2-5, Appendix B) reveals several interesting findings on the behavior of current account and the 
macroeconomic variables during the ten episodes, which are discussed below.   
Current Account Balance: Figure 2 (in Appendix B) depicts the median and average CA/GDP ratio for all 
ten transition countries under consideration and shows that the CA/GDP ratio continued to worsen at least 
3 years before it hit its minimum and then jumped substantially in the first year of the reversal by around 
8.5 percentage points on average. Afterwards, the adjustment process includes a gradual worsening of the 
current account balance in practically all the countries. In a typical case, the current account deficit 
reached almost 12 percent of GDP when it hit its minimum. However, the magnitude of the deficit/GDP 
ratio before the adjustment varies substantially between regions (the lowest deficit was found in the CEE 
region with about 6 percent of GDP; the highest was seen in the SEE region with almost 20 percent of 
GDP) as well as between countries (from 27 percent in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1998) to 2.9 percent in 
Slovenia (2000)).
12 Similarly, the relative improvements of current account balance in three years vary 
between 43 percent in Albania to around 220 percent in Ukraine (see Table 2 and Figure 2, Appendix B).         
Real GDP Growth: Analysis shows that the average and median real GDP growth peaks about two years 
before the deficit reaches its trough and is lowest when the deficit bottoms out. In contrast to previous 
findings (e.g. Freund (2000), Freund and Warnock (2005), Melecky (2005) etc.) where in the typical case 
the annual real income hit its trough in the first year the current account improved, income growth in 
transition countries reaches its trough simultaneously with current account deficits of more than 2 percent 
on average. Indeed, if we take into consideration the five-year period around the deficit minimum, only 
Poland and Slovenia reaches its GDP growth minimum in the first or second year of their recovery. 
Moreover, annual real GDP growth was around 5 percent or even more before the trough of the current 
account balance and then slowed down to around 2 percent in the year of the deficit’s trough. Latter, 
however, the growth returned and stabilized between 5 and 6 percent annually, on average (see Figure 3, 
Appendix B). While in most countries GDP slowdown is noticed in the pre-reversal period, we can 
assume that the GDP growth can have some predictive power for the reversal episode. Section 4 discusses 
this phenomenon in more detail. 
Budget Balance: As expected, the deterioration of the current account balance was associated with an 
expansion of the budget balance. However, not surprisingly, in the recovery period strong fiscal 
consolidation took place in the economies.
13 In the typical case there was a budget deficit between 4 and 6 
                                                 
12 Evidence for developed countries showed (see Mann (1999), Freund (2000) and Chinn and Prasad (2003)) that, on average, the 
current account tended to adjust when it approached levels around 4-5 percent of GDP. 
13 Indeed, Calvo (2003) argues that reversals are strongly associated with the fiscal system and its institutions. Moreover, he 
emphasizes that lowering the fiscal deficit is highly effective in the medium term yet it could be counterproductive in the short 
run if it relies on higher taxes.   12
percent of GDP in the year the current CA/GDP ratio bottomed out. As GDP growth has returned and 
stabilized, most countries have experienced improvements in their budget balances. These developments 
confirm the results of Aristovnik (2005) who claims that a 1 percentage point increase in the government 
budget deficit is associated on average with a 0.42 of a percentage point increase in the current account 
deficit-to-GDP ratio, with everything else being equal. The estimated coefficient also suggests that in 
transition countries private savings provide a significant but not a complete Ricardian offset to changes in 
public saving. In fact, as a ratio to GDP increases in private saving by about 0.6 of a percentage point are 
expected when the ratio of government saving to GDP decreases by 1 percentage point.
14    
Domestic Savings and Investment: Similar to previous findings (e.g. MFR (2000), Freund (2000)) on 
domestic savings and investment, in most countries under consideration the current account deterioration 
seems to be associated more with a decline in domestic savings than with an increase in investment. 
Accordingly, we might conclude that in most countries the current account decline was largely affected 
by an increase in domestic demand. This can be additionally confirmed by the cyclical slowdown of GDP 
growth which was not consistently accompanied by a reduction in the investment-to-GDP ratio. On the 
other hand, the improvement in the current account balance comes through an increase of both domestic 
savings and investment, albeit domestic savings played a more important role. In the typical case, the 
saving/GDP ratio fell about 5 percentage points in the year preceding the deficit minimum and there was 
almost no change in investment. As already mentioned, eventually saving behaviour was mostly driven 
by changes in the public-sector saving position, which is confirmed by the budget balance development 
pattern. Moreover, in the three years of adjustment the investment/GDP ratio fell by about 5 percentage 
points with about the same improvement in domestic savings. But nearly all of the countries in the sample 
experienced increased savings in the first two years after the CA/GDP ratio hits its trough, while only 
about one-half of the countries had increased their investment.       
Real Depreciation/Appreciation: Both the figure and summary statistics suggest that the current account 
adjustment process involved a real appreciation in the majority of sampled countries before the reversal. 
As presented in Table 2 and Figure 5 (Appendix B), the magnitude of the exchange rate correction varied 
considerably across episodes, whereby in some cases the domestic currency fell sharply (Moldova, 
Ukraine and Bosnia and Herzegovina) and in others appreciated significantly (Kyrgyz R. and Poland) in 
the first year of recovery. Thus, this finding suggests that the contribution of the real exchange rate to the 
current account adjustment tend to be ambiguous.
15 This is no surprise since we note that real appreciation 
observed over time may be partly a return to the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate after the initial 
overshooting.  
 
                                                 
14 This finding is identical to Edwards’ (1995) result for developing economies and similar to Jiang’s (2000) results for selected 
CEE economies.    
15 In addition, in most countries the adjustment process has been associated with relatively high inflation and a decline in the real 
interest rate. Latter, however, monetary tightening has significantly reduced inflation and increased real interest rates (see Table 2 
and Figure 4 (Appendix B)).   13
Moreover, persistent real appreciation may not be due to misalignments (e.g. capital inflows) only but 
also caused by changes in fundamentals (i.e. the Balassa-Samuelson effect) 
16  (Roubini and Wachtel, 
1999). Finally, due to the J-curve effect the real appreciation effects trade balances in the following years, 
as presented below. 
Exports, Imports and Trade Balance: For most countries under consideration the trade balance was an 
important contributor to the current account deficit, and practically for all countries the current account 
recovery was accompanied by a significant trade balance improvement. In the typical case, the trade 
balance deficit in the year the CA/GDP ratio reaches the minimum was around 12 percent of GDP. 
However, the deficit varied significantly with around 72 percent of GDP in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(1998) to 6 percent of GDP in Slovenia (2000). Before the current account balance the minimum trade 
balance had a negative trend with an improvement of about 8 percentage points in the first year of 
reversal. Later, in the next two recovery years trade balances stabilized and even stagnated. The trade 
balance development pattern can easily be explained by the dynamics of exports and imports of goods and 
services in the region. Most episodes are assisted by a deterioration of the export/GDP ratio and 
surprisingly also by a decline of the import/GDP ratio in at least two years before the current account 
minimum, implying the possible strong impact of imports of goods and services for exports in the region. 
Indeed, patterns of real export and import growth show a decline in both variables for most episodes 
before the reversal. Moreover, nearly all of the episodes are associated with an increase in the export/GDP 
ratio and a decrease in the import/GDP ratio in the first year after recovery. However, in the second year 
the recovery emerges primarily due to an increase of the export/GDP ratio in almost all the countries, 
while only about half of the countries have a declining import/GDP ratio.     
External Debt, International Reserve and Net Foreign Investment: External debt and international 
reserves (both as a GDP ratio) both have similar (growing) dynamics before the current account hits its 
trough. In the typical case, the external debt and international reserves accounted for around 46 percent of 
GDP and 12 percent of GDP, respectively, when the current account bottomed out. Afterwards, 
international reserves continued to increase in most countries in the recovery period. On the other hand, in 
the typical case external debt increased in the first year of recovery and in most of the countries gradually 
declined over the next two years to approximately the same level as it was before the recovery. As far as 
net foreign investment (in percent of GDP) is concerned, it seems this did not play any particular role in 
the reversal process as there is no systematic development of the aggregate in the region.     
Net International Investment Position: The analysis also shows that in most countries the net international 
investment position (NIIP) was declining contemporaneously with the deterioration of the current account 
balance in the years before the reversal. The NIIP of at least 5 countries for which data is available for the 
whole period under consideration had a negative and significantly low level of NIIP/GDP ratio with 
                                                 
16 In transition economies a large part of real appreciation accounts for the real appreciation that reflects productivity gains in the 
tradable sector (due to the Balassa-Samuelson (B-S) effect) This trend is commonly the case in fast growing economies, like 
transition economies, where the catch-up process is mainly driven by an increasingly productive tradable sector. For example, 
Coricelli and Jazbec (2001) estimated that B-S effects in (19 selected) transition economies were between 0.7-1.2 percent p.a. 
over the 1990-1998 period. Moreover, the dynamics of the real exchange rate in several CEE and SEE economies in the process 
of accession to the European Union can now be assimilated to those of previously acceding countries such as Spain, Portugal and 
Greece, with the B-S effect playing a dominant role in the later stages of their transitions.   14
deterioration continuing even after the reversals occurred. However, the magnitude of the (negative) 
NIIP/GDP ratio varied significantly with less than 13 percent of GDP in Slovenia to almost 138 percent 
of GDP in Kyrgyz Republic in the year the deficit hit its trough. However, consistent with Freund (2000) 
we do not find clear-cut evidence of a threshold for the ratio of the NIIP to GDP position. Indeed, 
practically in all of the episodes the reversal was associated with a further deterioration of the NIIP after 
the year the CA/GDP ratio bottoms out. In addition, tabular and graphical evidence confirms that the 
adjustments in the NIIP position are not systematically associated with the current account adjustment 
process in the transition countries (see Table 4 and Figure 5, Appendix B).  
Yet the presented developments imply nothing about causality, which has often been implicit in some of 
the previous literature. According to our tabular and graphical evidence, one plausible explanation might 
be that the current account position mainly reflects domestic internal imbalances. Indeed, external shocks 
(e.g. the Asian crisis (1997)) eventually just trigger a correction of those internal imbalances, which is 
confirmed by the number of episodes of both Reversals I and II (see Figure 1, Appendix B).
17 Therefore, 
to deepen our investigation of the reversal episodes we attempt to uncover the set of preconditions 
associated with a more benign outcome and the set associated with greater pain. Accordingly, we formed 
various measures in order to calculate correlation coefficients and evaluate their economic significance 
(for Reversal II episodes). We examine correlations between various outcomes such as relative GDP 
growth, the extent of appreciation/depreciation, the magnitude of current account improvements with 
various preconditions, such as the size of the current account trough, the extent to which the reversals was 
preceded by surges in investment, budget deficits or consumption, and the extent of external 
indebtedness. We use two measures of growth, i.e. average GDP growth after the reversal (from t+1 to 
t+3) relative to the three-year average GDP growth before the reversal (from t-3 to t-1) (GDPG 3-3) and 
average GDP growth in the three-year period after the reversal relative to growth from 1995 to 2003 
(GDPG 3-MR). In addition, we use a measure of the average appreciation/depreciation (ADEP) after the 
reversal and measure of percentage point improvement in the current account (ELEVATE) from t to t+3. 
While simple correlation coefficients are presented in Table 2, more details about the variables used in the 
analysis are listed in Appendix A. 
Despite the small number of observations in our sample, we can draw some interesting conclusions 
whereby some contradict the conclusions made for developed OECD economies (see Freund and 
Warnock (2005)).Theoretically, current account deficits associated with consumption booms and large 
budget deficits involve a difficult adjustment process. However, the correlations in Table 2 imply that in 
our sample (public and private) consumption does not appear to be strongly associated with GDP growth. 
Further, deficits driven by investment growth are associated with significantly slower GDP growth during 
recovery as well as with less depreciation. Moreover, counter to the evidence on private consumption 
public consumption-driven deficits effect depreciation significantly. Simple correlation coefficients also 
show a positive relationship between the budget balance and relative GDP growth (GDPG 3-3) as well as 
between the external debt position relative to GDP during the trough and an improvement in the current 
                                                 
17 Indeed, Edwards (2004) calculated that only around 29 percent of reversals in Eastern Europe coincided with ‘sudden stops’ of 
capital inflows and that around 43 percent of these ‘sudden stops’ happened at the same time as reversals. Moreover, McGettigan 
(2000) set out internal factors (in particular a worsening of the fiscal situation) of the predicament of both countries.   15
account. While the former correlation indicates the public sector’s significance for the adjustment 
process, the latter suggests that a higher external-debt-to-GDP ratio is associated with large improvements 
in the current account balance.  
 
Table 2: Correlation Coefficients for Reversal II Episodes in Transition Countries 
 
   
 
CA/GDP 
(trough) – 
CAT    
 
 
Investment/ 
GDP –  
INV   3-0 
 
 
Public 
balance/GDP 
– GOVB  3-0 
Public 
consumption 
growth – 
PUBCONG  
3-0 
 
Private 
consumption 
growth –  
PCONG 3-0 
 
External 
debt/GDP 
(trough) – 
EXTDEBT 
GDPG 3-3  -0.31 -0.58  0.22  -0.04 -0.01  -0.04
GDPG  
3-MR 
 
0.24 
 
-0.18 
 
-0.65 
 
0.22 
 
0.09 
 
-0.39
ADEP  0.06 0.77  -0.28  -0.66 0.71  0.63
ELEVATE  -0.80 -0.13  0.29  -0.40  0.23  0.82
Notes: At most 10 observations. For more details about the variables, see Appendix A.  
 
Sources: WDI, 2004; EIU 2004; EBRD 2004; own calculations. 
 
As we do not find evidence that a higher external-debt-to-GDP ratio results in any substantial relative 
output (GDPG 3-3) decline, we can find its moderate negative influence on GDP growth relative to the 
medium-run average. Surprisingly, larger external indebtedness is associated with lower exchange rate 
depreciation and significant improvements in the current account balance in the recovery period. Indeed, 
as investment-driven current accounts require less depreciation than episodes driven by (private and/or 
public) consumption, investment channels resources into exports which probably service the debt. In 
contrast with the findings for developed countries, the results also suggest that a higher deficit during the 
trough implies higher relative GDP growth (GDPG 3-3) and lower (medium-run) relative GDP growth 
(GDPG 3-MR) after the reversal, where the former could be associated with a significant deterioration of 
GDP growth during the period when the deficit is worsening.
18 Moreover, a higher current account at the 
minimum implies a (negligible) exchange rate depreciation in the recovery period. Finally, the results also 
show that current account deficits are 80 percent reversed after three years, which is about the same for 
industrial countries (see Freund and Warnock, 2005).  
3.3. Current account deficit persistency in transition countries 
In addition to reversals, we briefly investigate the persistency of current account deficits which could be, 
according to Section 3, quite a common event in the region. We define deficit as persistent (similar to 
Edwards (2004)) if the current-account-deficit-to-GDP ratio is higher than the region’s third quartile for at 
least three consecutive years. As is seen in Table 3 in Appendix B, a relatively large number of countries 
has experienced periods of high and persistent deficits. Indeed, we identify twelve episodes of persistent 
deficits in 11 countries when taking into account the whole transition region and ten episodes in 8 
                                                 
18 On the contrary, a simple regression between CA/GDP (trough) and GDP 3-3 for Reversal I episodes reveals that a 1 
percentage point higher deficit (in % of GDP) during a trough implies around (a statistically significant) 0.1 percentage point 
lower average relative GDP growth (GDP 3-3).   16
countries when considering a particular transition region (CEE, SEE and CIS), whereas five episodes 
coincide with the reversal event (Albania, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lithuania and Moldova) 
(see Tables 2 and 3, Appendix B). According to arbitrarily defined persistency and considering the whole 
transition region, the average current account deficit reaches around 17 percent of GDP and the average 
duration of a persistent episode is more than five years.  
 
Table 3: Characteristics of Persistent Current Account Deficit Episodes – Whole Transition Region 
(Unweighted Averages)
* 
 
Variable 
Persistent 
deficit 
countries, 
in episode 
Persistent 
deficit 
countries, 
out of 
episode 
Other 
transition 
countries 
EU-15 
(1995-
2003) 
CA/GDP  -16.8 -2.0 -3.7 0.2 
GDP growth  3.1 0.8 0.9 2.2 
Savings/GDP  0.0 14.0 18.7 20.0 
Investment/GDP  17.4 17.4 21.8 19.8 
Interest rate
**   2.9 -5.2 -0.8 4.7 
Budget balance/GDP  -7.4 -4.3 -3.4 -1.9 
Openness (in % of GDP)  94.6 110.6 93.5 65.2
*** 
Net FDI (in % GDP)  4.0 4.3 2.7 -1.2 
International reserves 
(in % of GDP)  12.6 15.7 11.3 5.5 
External debt/GDP  57.1 53.9 45.3 n.a. 
Notes:   
* Averages for all persistent and non-persistent episodes of 27 transition  
   countries and EU-15 countries in the 1992-2003 and 1995-2003 periods, 
   respectively.   
** Official real lending rate. 
*** Data for European Monetary Union. 
 
Sources: WDI, 2004; EIU 2004; EBRD 2004; own calculations. 
 
By analyzing and comparing persistent deficits (in episodes) with the current account deficits outside the 
episodes and also with all other transition countries as well as EU-15 countries, more or less expected 
results can be noticed (see Table 3). By definition, the current account position in the time horizons of a 
persistent deficit is on average extremely poor in comparisons with the out of episode period and with 
those countries that have not run persistent deficits. Moreover, key characteristics include lower than 
average and even zero savings rates, somewhat elevated positive real interest rates, a higher budget deficit 
and gross external debt. They are also somewhat more open even though this measure is highly variable 
and does not account for country size. Moreover, the higher level of international reserves in countries 
with persistent (out of episode) deficits in comparison with other transition counties may be the result of   17
the frequent use of some form of fixed exchange rate regimes in the former countries.
19 Finally, 
significantly higher GDP growth with investments-to-GDP and net-FDI-to-GDP at almost the same level 
as the out of episode situation suggest the high possibility of consumption-driven persistent current 
account deficits in the region.    
 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF REVERSALS ON ECONOMIC GROWTH  
4.1. Empirical methodology 
The aim of the empirical research is to identify the impact of current account reversals and some other 
selected variables on economic growth dynamics in transition countries in the 1992-2003 period. 
Following previous theoretical and empirical studies of MFR (1998), Freund (2000), Freund and 
Warnock (2005) and Melecky (2005), we estimate a model which may be expressed in the following 
general form:  
    G D P G it = αi  +  γt +  β'xit  +  εit  ,        (1) 
where the dependent variable is the percentage growth of real GDP (GDPG) for the i-th unit at time t and 
the vector of independent variables  (xi) includes relative GDP, the investment rate, the government 
(public) balance, openness of the economy, external debt and impulse dummy variable accounting for 
reversals. αi represents individual effects which are specific to individual countries, the vector β' is a 
vector of regression coefficients, γt denotes time-specific effects which are peculiar to a particular period 
but constant for all countries while the error term εit represents the effects of the omitted variables that are 
peculiar to both the individual units and time periods.  
According to the previous theoretical and empirical considerations, we expect a negative relationship 
between the growth of real GDP and the (lagged) relative GDP level. In fact, countries with a higher GDP 
level tend to grow relatively slower. Moreover, the variable may also be treated as a control for the 
cyclical part given the yearly frequency of observations. On the other hand, a positive effect is expected 
in the case of the investment rate as fixed capital formation should be an important impetus for domestic 
income growth. Further, an increase of government sector savings would probably have a positive impact 
on GDP growth while the impact of the openness of the economy is likely to be ambiguous. On the 
contrary, theoretical and empirical literature suggests a strong negative sign for the reversal dummy 
variable in at least the first recovery year. However, with econometric analysis we seek to examine the 
findings presented in the previous sections, i.e. that reversals in transition countries are systematically 
associated with GDP growth slowdown, which would confirm up-to-date empirical results (e.g. Melecky 
(2005)).  
4.2. Data 
We estimate model (1) on the basis of pooled cross-sectional and time-series (panel) data for transition 
countries in the 1992-2003 period. The data set comes from the EBRD Transition Reports, the Economist 
Intelligence Unit (EIU), IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) and Eurostat, and covers the 27 
                                                 
19 Some form of fixed exchange rate regime has been present in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and 
Turkmenistan.   18
transition countries, i.e. eight CEE, seven SEE and twelve CIS countries with 68 Reversal I episodes. Our 
estimates are based on unbalanced panel data while for some countries included in the sample data were 
unavailable for the whole period. The dependent variable is the growth of real GDP (GDPG), expressed 
as a percentage. Independent variables are (lagged) relative GDP (RGDP) as measured by the ratio of a 
country’s actual GDP per capita and EU-15 GDP per capita (in PPS), the investment rate (INVEST) 
measured as gross capital formation, the degree of openness (OPEN) measured as the sum of exports and 
imports of goods and services, government expenditure (GOVEXP) and external debt (EXTDEBT), all 
expressed as a percentage of GDP. The final and most important variable in our research, i.e. reversal 
(REV), is an impulse dummy variable measured with the value 1 for the year when the current account 
reaches the trough (t) and zeros otherwise. The empirical results are summarised in the next section where 
we estimate model (1) with the fixed-effect estimates (FEM), random-effect estimates (REM), estimates 
based on the feasible GLS method (FGLS) and panel corrected standard errors (OLS-PCSE). The results 
and tests are presented in Table 4.  
4.3. Empirical procedure 
Since panel data typically exhibit group-wise heteroscedastic, contemporaneously and serially correlated 
residuals, we must take into account the existence of a non-spherical error structure. As heterogeneity is 
the main characteristic of the countries under consideration, other specifications might be preferred to a 
simple OLS specification in our analysis. In fact, in the case of transition countries this argument is 
plausible once differences like macroeconomic conditions and structural reforms are taken into account. 
First we run the FEM model and REM model specifications with country effects and also time effects. 
The Breusch-Pagan LM test confirms the appropriateness of the model based on panel data. Moreover, 
Hausman’s test indicates that for the model in the case of transition countries a random effect model 
(REM) provides a better specification. In order to ensure a higher degree of robustness of the estimates 
we also employed two other methods: a revised Parks-Kmenta GLS method
20 and the Beck-Katz PCSE 
method including country and time-specific effects.   
First, we applied a modified Wald test for group-wise heteroscedasticity to check for any common 
variance in the panels. Critical values of Chi-squared with 25 degrees of freedom at a 1 percent 
significance level are 44.31, which are considerably lower than the test values obtained. Hence, we can 
reject the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity across the panels due to the different characteristics of the 
economies under consideration. Second, the contemporaneous or cross-sectional correlation is tested with 
the Breusch-Pagan LM test. According to the critical Chi-squared values a rejection of the null hypothesis 
of no cross-sectional correlation is possible. Third, the estimation rejects the null hypothesis of no serial 
correlation. In fact, critical values of Chi-squared with 1 degree of freedom at 1 percent significance level 
are equal to 6.63.  
To sum up, the results of the tests presented above revealed that there is panel heteroscedasticity, cross-
sectional correlation and a serial correlation of error terms in the sample. Therefore, we follow Beck and 
Katz’s (1996) proposal that in the case of more countries than annual observations per economy, as in our 
                                                 
20 The Parks-Kmenta method was revised by Beck and Katz (1996) who proposed the use of Feasible Generalized Least squares 
(FGLS) instead of GLS.   19
group of transition countries, the use of ordinary least squares with panel corrected standard errors (OLS-
PCSE) is mostly preferred. However, Chen et al. (2005) suggest that use of the OLS-PCSE method is 
most appropriate if we are concentrating on testing hypotheses and the use of the FGLS method if our 
prime interest is accurate coefficient estimates. Therefore, we additionally ran the model by using the 
FGLS method in order to ensure some degree of robustness.
  
4.4. Empirical results  
We now discuss the estimation results. The estimation results show that the convergence variable (relative 
lagged GDP) exhibits a correct but insignificant sign, which prevents us confirming that countries with a 
higher GDP level tend to grow relatively slower. Moreover, fixed capital accumulation is confirmed to be 
an important factor for economic growth in the region. In fact, a significant positive coefficient suggests 
that a 1 percentage point increase in capital formation would elevate real GDP growth by 0.22 percentage 
points in the region. The results further imply that the general government sector balance (i.e. budget 
balance) has a strong positive impact on real GDP growth in transition countries. By reducing the public 
deficit by one percentage point, GDP growth would increase by almost two-thirds of a percentage point. 
This suggests that fiscal consolidation in the region with an additional reduction of public deficits should 
be one of the key factors of the further real convergence process. The empirical results also imply there is 
a negative statistically significant relationship between the openness of an economy and economic 
growth, albeit it is relatively negligible. This result is inconsistent with a number of open-economy 
macroeconomic models which postulate that the costs of foreign shocks (including reversals) are 
inversely proportional to the country’s degree of openness. However, another possible explanation here 
could be the large heterogeneity emerging due to the different development stages in the considered 
transition countries.  
Finally, the most important variable for our analysis, i.e. the impulse dummy variable for reversal, is 
included in the model. Exploring the dynamics of the reversals by leading and lagging the dummy 
variable, all except for the one-year leading and two-year lagging impulse dummy variables did not bring 
any statistically significant results. Hence, we cannot statistically confirm any influence of reversals on 
the real GDP growth in the current (t) and subsequent year (t+1). Nevertheless, in accordance with the 
analyses in previous sections we calculated that the reversals in transition countries are associated with a 
positive increase of output by around 1.20 percentage points in the second year of recovery. The results 
suggest the high possibility of a relatively flexible adjustment and reallocation of resources. Indeed, a 
significant degree of substitutability of domestic and foreign capital probably exists in the region, which 
is related to the enormous growth potential in the region.
21 On the other hand, the reversal in the current 
account/GDP ratio exceeding the threshold of 3 percentage points is also associated with higher GDP 
growth by less than 1.25 percentage points of GDP growth in the year before the current account deficit 
bottoms out. Indeed, this result additionally suggests that less restrictively defined current account 
reversal is not systematically associated with GDP growth slowdown in the (pre-) reversal period in 
transition countries.    
                                                 
21 In fact, the result of the regression coefficient of the model, (S/Y)it = αi + β' (CA/Y)it + ε i, shows a positive and statistically 
significant result at 0.61, suggesting the reversals would increase aggregate savings, which accelerates investments and has 
positively (indirect) effects on GDP growth.    20
Table 4: Model (1) Estimations for Transition Countries, 1992-2003   
 (Dependent Variable: GDP Growth) 
 
 
Notes:   ***, **, * denote significance at the levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively; standard errors are presented 
below their corresponding coefficient.  
1 Fixed effects with country- and time-specific effects.
 2 Random effects with country- and time-specific 
effects.
 3 Feasible generalized least square with country- and time-specific effects, allowing for group-wise 
heteroscedasticity and panel specific error autocorrelation (AR1). 
4 Prais-Winsten regression with panel 
corrected standard errors (corrected for heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous correlation between panels 
and panel-specific AR1), with country- and time-specific effects.
 
 
Source: author’s calculations. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
The paper has provided some characteristics of sharp reductions in current account deficits in transition 
countries. The analysis focuses on three important aspects of those current account reversals: a) to 
examine the factors that might have triggered the reversals and to provide some insights into the current 
account adjustment process; b) to reveal some characteristics of persistent current account deficits; and c) 
to examine the direct impact of the reversals on economic growth in the region. The results of analyzing 
these issues reveal the following:  
 
 
Explanatory Variable 
 
FEM
1 
(two-way) 
 
REM
2 
(two-way) 
 
 
FGLS
3 
 
OLS - 
PCSE
4 
 
RGDPit-1 
  -0.047
 
(0.029) 
-0.042
 
(0.038) 
-0.020 
(0.027) 
-0.031
 
(0.021) 
 
INVESTit 
   0.365
** 
(0.119) 
   0.346
*** 
(0.085) 
      0.217
*** 
(0.067) 
    0.355
***   
(0.076) 
 
GOVBit
 
    0.670
*** 
(0.165) 
  0.645
*** 
(0.135) 
         0.631
*** 
(0.093) 
   0.497
*** 
(0.080) 
 
OPENit 
-0.047 
(0.029) 
   -0.055
*** 
(0.017) 
   -0.049
*** 
(0.013) 
   -0.060
*** 
(0.015) 
 
EXTDEBTit 
    0.094
*** 
(0.027) 
   0.082
*** 
(0.021) 
  0.037
** 
(0.018) 
    0.095
*** 
(0.020) 
 
REVit+1 
  1.960
* 
(1.162) 
1.716 
(1.191) 
0.259 
(0.634) 
1.250
* 
(0.746) 
 
REVit-2 
  2.834
** 
(1.131) 
  2.904
** 
(1.160) 
   1.182
*** 
(0.621) 
   2.675
*** 
(0.677) 
Adj. R
2  0.435 0.420  /  0.315 
No. of countries  26 26 26 26 
No. of obs.  259 259 259 259 
Hausman test  (χ2)  20.45 
Modified Wald test (χ2)    546.67
*** 
Breusch-Pagan LM (χ2)     15.04
*** 
Wooldbridge test (F)     11.24
***   21
a) When taking into account a restrictively defined reversal (Reversal II type), a typical adjustment occurs 
when the current account deficit has grown at least two consecutive years and reaches about 6 percent of 
GDP in CEE, 20 percent in SEE and 15 percent in CIS region. In the pre-reversal period the current 
account deterioration is likely to be associated with a deterioration in real GDP growth, domestic savings, 
export growth as well as in the decreasing budget and trade balance. Accordingly, growing external debt 
and a declining net international investment position are no surprise in the years before the reversal of the 
current account. In the recovery period, however, reversals involve real GDP growth, a domestic savings 
increase and a decline in investment, substantial budget balance improvements, real export growth, an 
increase of international reserves and an eventual leveling off of the external debt. Nevertheless, the role 
of exchange rate depreciation in a typical current account reversal episode seems to be ambiguous in the 
transition countries.  
Some deeper insights into the adjustment process suggest that deficits driven by investment growth are 
associated with significantly slower GDP growth during recovery as well as with significantly less 
depreciation/higher appreciation in comparisons with those episodes driven by private or public 
consumption. Moreover, (public) consumption-driven deficits increase exchange rate depreciation 
suggesting the public sector’s high level of significance of in the adjustment process. In contrast with the 
findings for developed countries the results also suggest that a higher deficit during a trough implies 
higher relative GDP growth after the reversal (in comparisons with the pre-reversal period) and lower 
relative GDP growth (in comparisons with the medium-run average). Finally, the results also show that 
current account deficits are 80 percent reversed after three years, which is approximately the same as with 
industrial countries. 
b) The average persistent current account deficit reaches around 17 percent of GDP and the average 
duration of a persistent episode is more than five years. Moreover, the current account position in the time 
horizons of a persistent deficit is on average extremely poor in comparisons with an out of episode period 
and with those transition countries that have not run persistent deficits. In addition, key characteristics 
include lower than average and even zero savings rates, somewhat elevated positive real interest rates, a 
higher budget deficit and gross external debt. Finally, the results suggest the high possibility of 
consumption-driven persistent current account deficits in the region.    
c) The empirical investigation suggests that the reversal (Reversal I type) in the current account/GDP 
ratio exceeding the threshold of 3 percentage points is not systematically associated with GDP growth 
slowdown in the years of the recovery. The empirical results might reflect the heterogeneity across 
episodes and are in a way consistent with the findings of Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998) for developing 
countries. However, the results reveal that the reversals in the region are associated with GDP growing by 
less than 1.25 percentage point in the year before the current account deficit bottoms out and with an 
increase of output by around 1.20 percentage points in the second year of recovery. 
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APPENDIX A. VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS AND DATA SOURCES 
 
The data used in this paper were drawn from a number of different sources. Below we provide a listing of 
the abbreviations (symbols) for the variables used in the analysis, a description of the variables and the 
source(s) from which the primary data for constructing these variables were taken.   
 
VARIABLE SYMBOL DESCRIPTION  SOURCE
* 
Economic growth   GDPG  Real economic growth 
(%)  WDI 
Relative 
convergence 
variable 
RGDP 
Ratio of country’s 
actual GDP per capita 
and EU-15 GDP per 
capita  
(in PPS) 
WDI, 
EUROSTAT 
Investment INVEST 
 
Gross fixed capital 
formation  
(% of GDP) 
WDI 
Openness OPEN 
 Sum of exports and 
imports of goods and 
services  
(% of GDP) 
WDI 
General 
government 
budget balance 
GOVB 
General government 
budget balance  
(% of GDP) 
EIU, 
EBRD 
External debt  EXTDEB  Gross external debt  
(in % GDP) 
EIU, 
EBRD 
Current account 
reversal  REV 
Impulse dummy 
variable  
(1 for the year the 
current account 
reaches the trough (t) 
and zeros otherwise) 
EIU 
EBRD 
IFS 
      
Current account 
balance during 
trough 
CAT 
Minimum current 
account balance before 
the reversal  
(% of GDP) 
EIU 
EBRD 
IFS   25
Investment before 
reversal  INV 3-0 
Percentage point 
growth in investment 
in three years before 
the reversal 
WDI 
General 
government 
budget balance 
before the 
reversal 
GOVB 3-0  
Percentage point 
growth in government 
budget in three years 
before the reversal 
EIU, 
EBRD 
Public 
consumption 
growth before 
the reversal  
PUBCONG 
3-0 
Percentage point 
growth in public 
consumption in three 
years before the 
reversal 
EBRD 
Private 
consumption 
growth before 
the reversal 
PCONG 3-0 
Percentage point 
growth in private 
consumption in three 
years before the 
reversal 
EBRD 
External debt 
during trough  EXTDEBT 
Gross external debt 
during the trough (%  
of GDP) 
EIU, 
EBRD 
Economic growth 
(3-3)  GDPG 3-3 
Average GDP growth 
after the reversal (from 
t+1 to t+3) relative to 
three years’ average 
GDP growth before 
the reversal (in %) 
WDI 
Economic growth 
(3-MR)  GDPG 3-MR 
Average GDP growth 
in three years after the 
reversal relative to 
growth from 1995 to 
2003 (in %) 
WDI 
Average 
depreciation  ADEP 
Average 
appreciation(+)/ 
depreciation(-) after 
the reversal  
(CPI-based) 
EIU, 
EBRD 
IFS 
Current account 
improvement  ELEVATE 
A percentage point 
improvement in the 
current account  
EIU 
EBRD 
IFS 
   
COUNTRIES 
included in the 
sample 
(Reversal I) 
 
CEE – Czech R., Estonia,  Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovakia, Slovenia; SEE – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro; 
CIS – Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz R., 
Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, 
Uzbekistan. 
COUNTRIES 
included in the 
sample 
(Reversal II) 
 
CEE – Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia;  SEE – Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina; CIS – Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyz R., Moldova, 
Ukraine 
 
COUNTRIES 
included in the 
sample 
(Persistency) 
 
CEE – Latvia and Lithuania;  SEE – Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina; CIS – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, 
Tajikistan and Turkmenistan  
 
 
* WDI – World Development Indicators (World Bank); EUROSTAT – EU database;  
      EBRD – Transition Report (different issues); IFS – International Financial Statistics (IMF). 
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Table 1: Current Account Reversals in Transition Countries (1992-2003)
 
 
Country 
No. of 
Observations 
No. of 
Reversals I 
Rev. I/Observ.  
(in %) 
No. of 
Reversals II 
Rev. II/Observ. 
(in %) 
CEE   
Czech R.  11  1 9.1 0  0.0
Estonia 12  1 8.3 0  0.0
Hungary 12  1 8.3 0  0.0
Latvia 12  2 16.7 0  0.0
Lithuania 11  1 9.1 1  9.1
Poland 12  2 16.7 1  8.3
Slovakia 11  3 27.3 0  0.0
Slovenia 12  1 8.3 1  8.3
Total (region)  93 12 12.9 3  3.2
SEE   
Albania 12  3 25.0 1  8.3
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  10 3 30.0 1  10.0
Bulgaria 12  3 25.0 0  0.0
Croatia 11  3 9.1 0  0.0
Macedonia 12  1 8.3 0  0.0
Romania 12  3 25.0 0  0.0
Serbia and 
Montenegro   10 3 30.0 0 0.0
Total (region)  79 19 24.1 2  2.5
CIS   
Armenia 11  3 27.3 1  9.1
Azerbaijan 10  3 30.0 0  0.0
Belarus 11  2 18.2 1  9.1
Georgia 12  2 16.7 0  0.0
Kazakhstan 12  4 33.3 0  0.0
Kyrgyz R.  10  4 40.0 1  10.0
Moldova 12  3 25.0 1  8.3
Russia
* 12  2 16.7 0  0.0
Tajikistan 11  5 45.5 0  0.0
Turkmenistan
* 12  4 33.3 0  0.0
Ukraine
* 10  2 20.0 1  10.0
Uzbekistan 11  3 27.3 0  0.0
Total (region)  134 37 27.6 5  3.7
Total  306 68 22.2 10  3.3
Notes:   
*Russia’s current account reversals include significant improvements in the current account surplus, as well 
as in some cases in Turkmenistan and Ukraine.   
 
Sources: WDI, 2004; EIU 2004; EBRD 2004; own calculations. 
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Table 2: Episodes of Current Account Adjustments (Reversal II) (1994-2003) 
 
CA in % of GDP 
Country (t)  t  t+3 
∆  over 3 
years 
(in %) 
Albania (1997)  -12.1 -6.9 43.0 
Armenia (2000)  -15.0 -7.7 48.7 
Belarus (1998)  -6.7 -3.5 47.8 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(1998) -27.0 -15.1 44.1 
Kyrgyz R. (1999)  -14.7 -2.2 85.0 
Lithuania (1999)  -11.1 -5.2 53.1 
Moldova (1998)  -19.7 -6.2 68.5 
Poland (2000)  -6.0 -2.0 67.5 
Slovenia (2000)  -2.9 0.1 101.9 
Ukraine (1998)   -3.1 3.7 219.2 
Median  -11.6 -4.3 60.3 
Average  -11.8 -4.5 77.9 
CEE Median  -6.0 -2.0 67.5 
 Average  -6.7 -2.4 64.5 
SEE Median  -19.6 -11.0 43.7 
 Average  -19.6 -11.0 43.7 
CIS Median  -14.7 -3.5 76.2 
 Average  -11.8 -3.2 73.1 
 
Notes:   requirement a) is not met by Russia; requirement b) is not met by Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, and 
Uzbekistan; requirement c) is not met by Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, 
Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and 
Montenegro, Slovakia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; requirement d) is not met by 
Estonia and Latvia. 
 
Sources: WDI, 2004; EIU 2004; EBRD 2004; own calculations. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Episodes of Persistent Current Account Deficits (1992-2003)
 * 
 
Country 
Within 
the whole 
transition 
region 
Within 
the 
region 
country 
belongs
Length 
of 
Episode 
(whole 
region) 
 
 
Length of 
Episode 
(particular 
region)  
Average 
deficit 
(whole 
region)  
in % of 
GDP 
Average 
deficit 
(particular 
region) 
in % of 
GDP 
Albania 
1992 – 
1997 
1992 – 
1994  6 3 -23.6 -37.7 
Armenia 
1993 – 
2003 
1994 – 
1997   11 4 -14.6  -17.3   28
   1999 – 
2002  4
 
-7.4 
Azerbaijan 
1994 – 
1999 
1995 – 
1998 6 4 -20.5  -24.9 
1994 – 
1998  
1994 – 
1998   5 5 -21.9 -21.9 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
** 
2000 – 
2003 
2000 – 
2003  4 4 -15.6 -15.6 
Georgia 
1992 – 
1997 
1992 – 
1994   6 3 -20.5  -32.0 
Latvia 
1998 – 
2003 
1998 – 
2001 6 4 -9.0  -9.3 
Lithuania 
1995 – 
    2000  
1995 – 
1999 6 5 -9.5  -10.3 
Moldova 
1993 – 
1998 --  6 -- -12.0  -- 
Slovakia 
1996 – 
1998 --  3 -- -9.6  -- 
Tajikistan 
1993 – 
1995  -- 3 -- -21.3  -- 
Turkmenistan  
1997 – 
1999 
1997 – 
1999   3 3 -30.5 -30.5 
Average   5.4 3.9 -17.4  -20.7 
Notes:    
* A country has persistent current account deficit when it is higher than region’s  
third quartile for at least three consecutive years.   
** Episode may not have ended as of 2003. 
 
  Source: WDI, 2004; EIU 2004; EBRD 2004; own calculations. 
 
 
 
Table 4:   Summary Statistics (Reversal II) – Domestic Macroeconomic Conditions 
a 
  Year (t) – Deficit Minimum 
  t-2  t-1  t  t+1  t+2  t+3 
Real GDP growth (in %) 
Median  7.05 4.95 3.90 3.95 5.70 5.40
Average  11.84 7.83 2.19 4.79 5.80 5.80
No. increasing  8 9 6 8  10 9
No. decreasing  2 1 4 2 0 1
∆ real (lending) interest rate (in percentage points) 
Median  2.85  1.28  0.03 -6.67 -0.58 -0.36
Average  14.00 1.60 0.68  -10.07 3.02 4.61
No. increasing  7 5 5 2 4 4
No. decreasing  2 4 4 7 5 5
 ∆  budget balance/GDP (in percentage points) 
Median  0.64  -0.08  -0.48 0.44 1.30 0.64
Average  0.43  -0.29  -0.31 0.95 1.14 0.49
No. increasing  7 5 3 6 7 7
No. decreasing  3 5 7 4 3 3  29
∆  government revenue/GDP (in percentage points) 
Median  0.95  -0.76  -1.51 0.11 0.15  -0.54
Average  2.02 -1.11  0.11  0.02 -0.24 -0.60
No. increasing  7 4 1 5 5 5
No. decreasing  3 6 9 5 5 5
∆  government expenditure/GDP (in percentage points) 
Median  -0.16 0.68  -0.57 0.76  -1.33  -1.09
Average  0.75 -0.49  0.69 -0.29 -1.28 -1.44
No. increasing  5 6 4 6 3 2
No. decreasing  5 4 6 4 7 8
∆  real public consumption growth (in percentage points) 
Median  -3.40  -0.30  -1.50 0.90 0.30  -0.20
Average  -7.75  -2.33  -2.28 3.13 1.20 0.53
No. increasing  3 4 2 6 5 3
No. decreasing  5 5 7 3 4 4
∆  domestic saving/GDP (in percentage points) 
Median  5.66  -1.03  -0.29 2.65 1.78  -1.66
Average  2.92  -4.69 3.77 2.65 1.52  -0.72
No. increasing  7 3 6 7 8 5
No. decreasing  3 7 4 3 2 5
∆  domestic investment/GDP (in percentage points) 
Median  -0.02 1.03  -0.53  -3.52 0.16  -1.30
Average  3.54 -1.60  2.68 -5.20  1.69 -0.42
No. increasing  5 6 5 4 5 4
No. decreasing  5 4 5 6 5 6
∆  real private consumption growth (in percentage points) 
Median  -1.60  2.80 -1.40 -0.70 -0.70  2.60
Average  -0.84 6.84  -6.90  -0.23 4.14 2.84
No. increasing  3 6 4 4 4 6
No. decreasing  5 3 5 5 5 1
∆  inflation rates (in percentage points) 
Median  10.29 11.16  9.51 13.56  4.40  3.35
Average  -102.77  -5.25  3.64  22.78 -16.30 -15.06
No. increasing  0 3 5 5 3 1
No. decreasing  10 7 5 5 7 9
a The total number of observations varies by year because of missing data. 
 
Sources: WDI, 2004; EIU 2004; EBRD 2004; own calculations. 
 
 
Table 5:   Summary Statistics (Reversal II)– External Conditions 
a 
  Year (t) – Deficit Minimum 
  t-2  t-1  t  t+1  t+2  t+3 
Real effective exchange rate (appreciation +/depreciation -) 
Median  9.75  4.15  5.84 -1.33 -2.60 -1.75
Average  10.72 -1.67  4.28  0.38 -0.07 -1.17
No. apprec.  5 4 5 3 3 3
No. deprec.  1 2 2 4 4 4
∆ export (goods and services)/GDP (in percentage points) 
Median  -0.56  -1.13 1.11 0.99 2.35 0.86
Average  0.30  -0.12 0.05 2.34 2.56 0.11  30
No. increasing  4 3 6 7 8 6
No. decreasing  6 7 4 3 2 4
∆  real export growth (in percentage points) 
Median  -2.75 -6.50 -1.70  1.10  7.80 -2.25
Average  -6.44 -9.54 -9.94  6.00 12.79 -8.57
No. increasing  3 1 4 5 5 2
No. decreasing  5 8 5 4 4 4
∆  import (goods and services)/GDP (in percentage points) 
Median  -1.05 -1.05 -0.25 -2.60  0.35  2.60
Average  -0.75 0.33  -1.09  -2.78 1.40 1.63
No. increasing  4 4 5 2 5 6
No. decreasing  6 6 5 8 5 4
∆  real import growth  (in percentage points) 
Median  -3.45 -6.70 -6.40 -3.90  5.10 -0.30
Average  -13.06 -1.96  -12.89 -1.33 14.19  0.87
No. increasing  2 2 4 3 6 3
No. decreasing  6 7 5 6 2 3
∆  trade balance/GDP (in percentage points) 
Median  -0.89  -2.07 0.44 4.52 1.13 0.07
Average  -0.38 -1.40 -1.57  7.82 -0.12 -0.81
No. increasing  4 4 7  10 7 5
No. decreasing  6 6 3 0 3 5
∆  net FDI/GDP (in percentage points) 
Median  0.78  0.28 -0.54 -0.27  0.09 -0.02
Average  1.19 0.46  -0.60 0.62 0.02  -0.52
No. increasing  8 7 4 4 5 6
No. decreasing  2 3 6 6 5 4
∆  external debt/GDP (in percentage points) 
Median  -0.59 3.90 3.48 0.63 0.60  -1.63
Average  -9.63 2.74 0.64 5.28  -1.31  -2.65
No. increasing  5 9 7 6 6 3
No. decreasing  5 1 3 4 4 7
∆  international reserves/GDP (in percentage points) 
Median  0.47 0.45 1.21 0.19 1.90 0.28
Average  0.39 0.34 1.10 1.15 3.35 0.42
No. increasing  7 6 6 5 9 7
No. decreasing  3 4 4 5 1 3
∆  net international investment position/GDP (in percentage points) 
Median  -4.91 -4.98 -7.78 -1.51  0.52 -2.48
Average  -7.71 -7.93  -15.67 -4.50 -0.05 -3.10
No. increasing  0 0 0 3 4 1
No. decreasing  5 6 6 4 3 4
a The total number of observations varies by year because of missing data. 
 
Sources: WDI, 2004; EIU 2004; EBRD 2004; own calculations. 
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Figure 1:   Frequency and Mean of CA Improvements of Reversal Occurrences  
in Transition Countries (1993-2003) 
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Sources: WDI (2004), EIU (2004), EBRD (2004), own calculations. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Current Account Reversals in Transition Countries (CA/GDP) – Reversal I and Reversal II  
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Sources: WDI, 2004; EIU 2004; EBRD 2004; own calculations. 
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Figure 3:  The Impact of Current Account Reversals on Economic Growth in Transition Countries –  
Reversal I and Reversal II  
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Sources: WDI, 2004; EIU 2004; EBRD 2004; own calculations. 
 
Figure 4:    Current Account Reversals in 10 Transition Countries – Reversal II  
(Domestic Macroeconomic Conditions) 
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Government expenditure/GDP
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Sources: WDI, 2004; EIU 2004; EBRD 2004; own calculations. 
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Figure 5:    Current Account Reversals in 10 Transition Countries – Reversal II   
(External Sector Conditions) 
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Sources: WDI, 2004; EIU 2004; EBRD 2004; own calculations. 
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